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Abstract
Background: The claim that recollection and familiarity based memory processes have distinct
retrieval mechanisms is based partly on the observation that masked repetition and semantic
priming influence estimates of familiarity derived from know responses but have no effect on
estimates of recollection derived from remember responses. Close inspection of the experiments
on which this claim is based reveal the effect size to be small, potentially the result of a type-2 error,
and/or inflated due to participants not having the opportunity to report guesses. This paper re-
evaluates these claims by attempting a partial replication of two such Experiments.
Methods: In Experiment 1 participants made remember, know, and guess responses following
primed and unprimed target words. In Experiment 2 participants made sure, unsure, and guess
following primed and unprimed target words.
Results: In Experiment 1 the repetition priming effect occurred only for guess responses and only
for unstudied items. In Experiment 2 the priming effect occurred for both unsure and guess
responses, but again only for unstudied items.
Conclusion: The data are consistent with the view that remembering and knowing do not
correspond to confidence ratings; and suggest that contrary to earlier findings, recollection and
familiarity do not differ in retrieval mechanisms. As such the effects of repetition priming on
subjective reports of remembering should not be cited as evidence for the distinction between
recollection and familiarity based memory processes.
Background
Over the past few decades a considerable amount of
research has led to the conclusion that recognition mem-
ory is composed of at least two functionally distinct proc-
esses. These are recollection and familiarity, and this
theoretical position has become known as Dual process
theory [1]. Proponents of Dual process theory argue that
recollection and familiarity give rise to distinct phenome-
nal states. Recollection-based memory is accompanied by
a phenomenal sense of remembering in which awareness of
the episodic aspects of the study event, such as the context,
are consciously re-experienced. By contrast, familiarity-
based memory is accompanied by a phenomenal sense of
knowing whereby the person feels that an item was studied
but does not re-experience any specific information about
the study event. It follows that the relative contribution of
recollection and familiarity can be estimated asking par-
ticipants to report their subjective experience of remem-
bering by making remember and know judgments [2,3]. In
Tulving's original formulation remembering was thought
to be a product of autobiographical memory and knowing
associated with semantic memory and conceptual knowl-
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episodic and semantic memory is subsumed by the dis-
tinction between recollection and familiarity processes
that are more closely associated with neuropsychological
systems [5,6]. In each case know responses are treated as a
measure of the relative contribution of familiarity based
processes and remember responses as a measure of the rel-
ative contribution of recollection based memory. That is
variations in the conscious experience of remembering
provide a method to examine and indeed measure under-
lying memory processes.
Evidence that recollection and familiarity are functionally
distinct, perhaps even independent, processes comes from
a number of functional and task dissociations of remember
and know judgments [7]. Some manipulations result in
larger estimates of recollection; for example, 'deeper' lev-
els of processing at study result in a higher proportion of
remember responses relative to 'shallower' levels of
processing [2]. Other manipulations result in larger esti-
mates of familiarity, for example non-word recognition is
associated with a higher proportion of know responses
than is word recognition [8].
According to most formulations of Dual process theory
recollection and familiarity have distinct retrieval charac-
teristics [1]. According to this account familiarity involves
signal detection. To-be-recognized items vary in memory
'strength'; items that have recently been studied have a
higher memory 'strength' than items that have not been
studied. To decide whether a to-be-recognized item has
been studied the participant sets a criterion. Any items
that exceed the criterion in memory 'strength' are
endorsed as old, while items lower in 'strength' than the
criterion are rejected as new. By contrast recollection is
thought to involve an all-or-none retrieval mechanism, in
the sense that the subject either remembers studying the
item (due perhaps to the automatic retrieval of contextual
details) or they do not. This model makes two key predic-
tions: First, familiarity is similar to, and should vary with,
confidence while recollection should not; and second,
familiarity, but not recollection, should be subject to flu-
ency manipulations. That is, any variable that increases an
item's memory 'strength' should increase estimates of
familiarity but should have no effect on estimates of rec-
ollection [9].
A simple and robust method of artificially enhancing
processing fluency at test is repetition priming. In this
preparation the to-be-recognized target items are pre-
ceded by a pattern masked prime that is either the same as
(related) or different than (unrelated) the to-be-recog-
nized target. Such repetition priming is known to increase
the endorsement rates across both old and new test items
[10], but relatively few studies have examined whether
artificial manipulations of processing fluency influence
confidence ratings and subjective reports of remembering.
One such study, reported by Rajaram [11], has become
highly influential in the Dual Process literature and
appears in the majority of reviews. At the time of writing
this study has received 300 citations (Web of Science,
accessed Wednesday 21st February 2007). In one experi-
ment Rajaram presented participants with old and new
words, half the items were primed by a brief presentation
of the target item and half were unprimed (these were pre-
ceded by a brief presentation of an irrelevant item). Partic-
ipants made more know judgments to primed than to
unprimed items but there was no such effect on the pro-
portion of remember judgments. These data are consistent
with the view that know judgments are based on an assess-
ment of memory 'strength' but remember judgments are
not. By contrast, when, in a second experiment remember
and know judgments were substituted with categorical
confidence ratings of sure and unsure the repetition prim-
ing effect was apparent for both responses. These data sug-
gest that confidence ratings reflect an assessment of
memory 'strength' and that sure responses do not corre-
spond to remember judgments. The important findings of
these two experiments is that estimates of recollection
based processing based on remember judgments are not
affected by manipulations of memory 'strength', the cor-
ollary being that recollection and familiarity have distinct
retrieval mechanisms. However, close inspection of the
results of these two experiments reveal issues that, given
the influential nature of the study, warrant further analy-
ses and replication.
The first issue concerns the effect sizes. The overall effect
size for the repetition priming effect on know responses is
small, being in the region of Cohen's d = .22. Second, the
results were analysed by means of a series of pair-wise
comparisons that were not corrected for error inflation.
The reason behind this was that there had been some dis-
agreement as to whether it is proper to analyse responses
of this kind as a factor in Analyses of Variance. Some
authors argue that because the responses are mutually
exclusive and not independent, ANOVAis inappropriate.
Another group argues that ANOVA violating this assump-
tion is at worst trivial and usually inconsequential. How-
ever, a problem only occurs if the data iscompositional in
nature. Nonetheless Rajaram used planned t-tests rather
than an ANOVA to determine whether the tests were jus-
tified. The advantage of the ANOVA method is that the
comparisons are performed using the overall error term as
a control for error inflation. Omitting the ANOVA elimi-
nates this control and is thus subject to error inflation irre-
spective of whether the tests were planned or otherwise.
Examination of the results reported by Rajaram indicate
that had the probability of a type-2 error been controlled
in these tests the effect may not have been observed. WithPage 2 of 7
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critical values of the Bonferroni corrected t-test is 2.71
[12]. Of the two relevant t-tests reported by Rajaram only
the effect of repetition priming on know responses to
unstudied words reached the criterion for significance.
That is, the effect on studied words may be the result not
of repetition priming but of type-2 error inflation. Finally,
the repetition priming effect on know responses for
unstudied items, albeit small, could be inflated as a con-
sequence of the limited range of response options availa-
ble to participants. Later studies have given participants
the option of guessing in addition to remembering and
knowing [13]. The rationale for this is that if participants
are guessing but do not have the option of reporting their
response as such then they are forced to report their guess
response as knowing on the assumption that it is the near-
est level of confidence. This would artefactually inflate
estimates of familiarity based on know responses.
In a similar experiment to Experiment 3 in Rajaram [11],
Rajaram and Geraci [14] demonstrated that semantically
related primes influenced estimates of familiarity based
on know responses but, as in the repetition priming exper-
iments had no effect on remember responses. With the
exception of the nature of the prime-target relation, the
design and analyses of this experiment were identical to
Rajaram's Experiment 3. The estimated overall effect size
for the know responses is again relatively small (Cohen's d
= .28). Of the four pair-wise comparisons, Rajaram and
Geraci reported that "significantly more Know responses
were assigned to studied targets when the prime was
related than when it was unrelated, t(71) = 2.69, SEM =
.02)". This does reach the critical value of the Bonferroni
corrected t' for four comparisons with 75 degrees of free-
dom (2.56, as does the effect on unstudied items (t(71) =
4.29). However, rather than reflecting a manipulation of
fluency these effects could also be due to the absence of a
guess category.
The two experiments that follow aim to re-evaluate the
effects of repetition priming on subjective reports of
remembering and of confidence. If the effects observed by
Rajaram in her Experiment 3 are due to distinct retrieval
mechanisms for recollection and familiarity then the
inclusion of a guess response option should not diminish
the effect. On the other hand, if the effect is diminished or
eliminated then the effects observed by Rajaram are not
evidence for separate retrieval mechanisms and question
at least one distinguishing feature of recollection and
familiarity. In Experiment 1 participants made remember,
know and guess responses. Experiment 2 was identical with
the exception that participants made sure, unsure, and
guess responses. The comparison is relevant because,
whatever the outcome of Experiment 1, any difference in
behaviour for confidence responses would still be consist-
ent with the view that remembering and knowing do not
merely reflect levels of confidence, but would place a
question mark over the claim that remember and know
responses are dissociated by repetition priming and the
nature of the retrieval mechanisms involved in recollection
and familiarity.
Methods
Participants
Twenty members of the University of Nottingham com-
munity took part in Experiment 1. Seven were male and
thirteen were female. Their mean age was 20 years (SD =
0.83). Twenty-nine members of the University of Notting-
ham community took part in Experiment 2. Thirteen were
male and sixteen were female. Their mean age was 24
years (SD = 1.20).
Design & Stimuli
Both experiments used a 2 × 2 design with Item (Old vs.
New) and Prime (Related vs. Unrelated) as within-sub-
jects factors. The stimuli consisted of 180 English nouns
obtained from the MRC Psycholinguistic database [15].
These were between 5 and 7 letters long (mean = 5.92, SD
= 0.82). Ninety items were designated as Old items and
were presented during study and test. The remaining
ninety were designated as New items and were only pre-
sented during the test. The prime items consisted of half
of the Old and New items so that that half the test items
were a repetition of the prime item, and a further set of 90
unrelated prime words selected from the MRC database in
the same way.
Procedure
The study phase of each experiment was identical. Partici-
pants were instructed to memorize the words presented
on the computer screen. Each word appeared for 3 sec-
onds with an inter-trial interval of 1 second. There was a
15 minute retention interval between the end of the study
phase and the start of the test phase. During this period
participants were given a newspaper to read. Next, the par-
ticipants were informed that they would see some more
words and to indicate which were old and which were
new. Each test trial consisted of four events: first, a mask
of 7 ampersands appeared for 500 msecs, followed by the
prime word for 50 msecs, and a second mask for 500
msecs, and finally, the target item. No instructions were
given regarding the masked prime. In Experiment 1 partic-
ipants were instructed to report their experience of
remembering using the categories remember, know or guess
whenever they indicated that an item was old. We used
the 'standard' instructions to describe the difference
between remembering and knowing [7]. These use face
recognition to describe the differences between recollec-
tion and familiarity. For example, recollection is described
as when a face is recognized along with contextual detailsPage 3 of 7
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topic of conversation. Familiarity is described as when a
face is recognized but without any of the accompanying
contextual details such as the name. Although these
instructions differ from those used by Rajaram the two are
very similar and are unlikely to result in any differences in
how participants report their experiences of remembering.
The testing procedure used in Experiment 2 was identical
with the exception that whenever an item was identified
as old participants were asked to report how confident
they were in their decisions using the options of sure,
unsure and guess, instead of making remember, know, or
guess judgments.
Results
Experiment 1
The mean response probabilities for each category of sub-
jective report are shown in Figure 1 as a function of Item
and Prime. These data were entered into a 3 × 2 × 2
ANOVA with Response, Item, and Prime as within-sub-
ject-factors. The criterion for significance was set to α = .05
for all analyses and degrees of freedom were adjusted
using the Greenhouse-Geisser method where the assump-
tion of sphericity was violated. The effect of Response
failed to reach significance (F(2, 38) = 1.60, MSE = 0.03,
p = .22,  = .08). There was an effect of Item (F(1, 19) =
25.58, MSE < 0.01, p < .01,  = .87) indicating reliable
discrimination between Old and New items; and an effect
of Prime (F(1, 19) = 22.93, MSE < 0.01, p < .01,  = .55)
indicating that Related primes increased endorsements
relative to Unrelated primes. There was a two-way interac-
tion between Response and Item (F(1.43, 27.11) = 22.06,
MSE = 0.03, p < .01,  = .54) that reflects the higher pro-
portion of response of each kind for Old items relative to
New ones. The two-way interaction between Response
and Prime failed to reach significance (F(2, 38) = 1.63,
MSE < 0.01, p = .21,  = .08); although there was a reli-
able interaction between Item and Prime (F(1, 19) = 5.62,
MSE < 0.01, p < .03,  = .23). The three-way interaction
between Response, Item, and Prime failed to reach signif-
icance (F(2, 38) = 2.44, MSE < 0.01, p < .10,  = .11).
To examine the repetition-priming effects on responses
separate analyses were conducted for Old and New items.
For the Old items there was a main effect of Response
(F(1.29, 24.52) = 7.10, MSE < 0.05, p < .01,  = .27)
indicating that participants made more remember
responses than know or guess responses, and an effect of
Prime indicating that items preceded by a Related prime
were more likely to be endorsed than those preceded by
an Unrelated prime (F(1, 19) = 11.02, MSE < 0.01, p < .01,
 = .37), but critically there was no interaction between
the two (F(2, 38) < 1.0, MSE < 0.01, p = .60,  = .03). For
the New items there was an effect of Response (F(1.27,
24.22) = 29.13, MSE < 0.02, p < .01,  = .61), an effect
of Prime (F(1, 19) = 19.23, MSE < 0.01, p < .01,  = .50),
and an interaction between the two (F(1.36, 25.76) =
4.65, MSE < 0.01, p = .03,  = .20).
Multiple pair-wise comparisons using the Bonferroni cor-
rection were conducted to examine the effect of Prime on
Response for the New items. Rajaram reported that prim-
ing increased the proportion of know responses, but had
no effect on remember responses. The same comparisons
performed on these data, with the addition of the guess
response option, reveal no effect on remember responses
(t'(19) = 1.14, SD = 0.03, p > .05); nor, in contrast to the
data reported by Rajaram, on know responses (t'(19) =
1.53, SD = 0.06 p > .05). There was however, a reliable
effect of priming on guess responses (t'(19) = 3.16, SD =
0.11, p < .05). The effect of priming is localized within the
guess responses to New items, not on familiarity. This
effect is not trivial: Cohen's d = .71.
In short, the results of this experiment show that the locus
of the repetition priming effect on subjective reports of
confidence is on guess responses to unstudied items. The
contention is that effects observed by Rajaram (Experi-
ment 3) are due to (a) type-2 error, and (b) participants
reported their guesses as know responses. Experiment 2 is
identical with the exception that participants made sure
and unsure responses instead of remember and know
responses to check that subjective reports of remembering
do not correspond to confidence ratings.
Experiment 2
The mean response probabilities for each category of sub-
jective report are shown in Figure 2 as a function of Item
and Prime. These data were entered into a 3 × 2 × 2
ANOVA with Response, Item, and Prime as within-sub-
ject-factors. There was an effect of Response indicating
that participants made more sure responses than any other
(F(1.50, 42.02) = 31.32, MSE = 0.08, p < .01,  = .53),
and an effect of Item indicating reliable discrimination
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0.01, p < .01,  = .87); but in contrast with Experiment
1 there was no effect of Prime (F(1, 28) = 1.30, MSE =
0.03, p = .26,  = .04). There was an interaction between
Response and Item (F(1.25, 34.88) = 99.01, MSE = 0.02,
p < .01,  = .78) that reflects the higher proportion of
sure and unsure responses for old items relative to new
ones; an interaction between Response and Prime
(F(1.59, 44.62) = 3.41, MSE = 0.01, p < .05,  = .11), and
an interaction between Item and Prime (F(1, 28) = 10.40,
MSE < 0.01, p < .01,  = .27). Finally, like Experiment 1
the three-way interaction between Response, Item, and
Prime failed to reach significance (F(2, 56) = 1.02, MSE <
0.01, p = .37,  = .04).
To examine the interactions, the effects of Prime on
Response were analyzed for Old and New items sepa-
rately. For the Old items there was an effect of Response
resulting from more sure responses than unsure or guess
responses (F(1.32, 36.45) = 60.74, MSE = 0.08, p < .05, η
= .68), but no effect of Prime (F(1, 28) = 2.24, MSE < 0.01,
p > .05,  = .07) nor an interaction between the two
(F(1.47, 41.27) = 2.50, MSE < 0.01, p > .05,  = .08). The
absence of a priming effect on responses to Old items rep-
licates the pattern observed in Experiment 1 and also
reported by Rajaram. The critical comparisons concern the
location of the effect for New items. There was no effect of
Response for New items (F(2, 56) = 2.55, MSE = 0.02, p =
.09,  = .08). There was an effect of Prime (F(1, 28) =
8.98, MSE < 0.01, p < .01,  = .24), but no interaction
between the two (F(2, 56) = 1.17, MSE < 0.01, p = .32, 
= .04).
Pair-wise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction
were conducted to examine the effect of Prime on
Response for New items separately. In Experiment 1 the
only effect of repetition priming was on guess responses.
The same comparisons performed on these data reveal no
effect on sure responses (t'(28) = 1.28, SD = 0.06, p > .05);
there was an effect on unsure responses (t'(28) = 2.70, SD
= 0.7, p < .05) and a marginal effect on guess responses to
new items (t'(28) = 2.21, SD = 0.04, p < .05).
The results of Experiment 2 are consistent with the view
that subjective reports of remembering do not correspond
to subjective reports of confidence. That is, although
Experiment 1 places a question mark over whether or not
recollection and familiarity differ in retrieval, subjective
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Proportion of remember, know, and guess responses for related and unrelated primes for Panel A: Old items, and Panel B: New ItemsFigure 1
Proportion of remember, know, and guess responses for related and unrelated primes for Panel A: Old items, and Panel B: New 
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and valid means to study them.
Discussion
The effects of repetition priming on subjective reports of
remembering and confidence were re-evaluated in two
Experiments. The claim that repetition priming increases
know responses but not remember responses has been
important in the development of dual process models of
recognition memory. The re-evaluation was motivated by
close inspection of two experiments on which this claim
is partly based [11]. That is, the previously reported effects
were small, based on uncorrected pair-wise comparisons,
and potentially inflated by the absence of a guess response
option. Given the influential nature of these studies in our
understanding of recognition memory a replication was
necessary and justified. Our results showed that the locus
of the repetition priming effect on subjective reports of
remembering was solely on guess responses to previously
unstudied items; not, as had previously been reported, on
know responses to both studied and unstudied items.
Experiment 2 also found that the repetition priming effect
was restricted to unstudied items, but increased the pro-
portion of both unsure and guess responses. There was no
effect on the proportion of sure responses. One possibility
is that the use of a 3-point confidence scale may not have
been sensitive enough to detect an effect of priming on
studied items. However, earlier research suggests that this
is unlikely because in related experiments shorter scales
(2-point) are more sensitive than longer confidence scales
(50% to 100%) [16,17].
Conclusion
It is important to note that the arguments herein are not
based on null results. In each case reliable main effects
and interactions were obtained, even when comparisons
were adjusted for error inflation. Instead the arguments
are based on the finding that the locus of the repetition
priming effect is when participants guess about items that
they have not seen before. This has an obvious implica-
tion for dual process theory. If manipulations of process-
ing fluency do not differentially affect either measure of
the subjective experience of remembering, then recollec-
tion and familiarity may share the same retrieval mecha-
nism. They may remain distinct and even independent
processes, but in this respect they are similar. It is ironic
that the increase in unsure and guess responses as a result
of priming observed in Experiment 2 is similar to the pat-
tern previously claimed for know responses. However, the
fact that the pattern of results differs according to whether
participants report their experience of remembering or
their confidence in their responses is consistent with the
view that remember and know responses do not merely
reflect levels of confidence.
Proportion of sure, unsure, and guess responses for related and unrelated primes for Panel A: Old items, and Panel B: New ItemsFigure 2
Proportion of sure, unsure, and guess responses for related and unrelated primes for Panel A: Old items, and Panel B: New 
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An alternative to questioning the existence of distinct
retrieval mechanisms for recollection and familiarity has
been to assume that they exist but to attempt to fit a sin-
gle-process model. Recently Dunn [18] provided a cogent
exposition of how the apparent dissociation between rec-
ollection and familiarity on the one hand, and confidence
on the other, could be more parsimoniously explained by
a signal detection model. In fact all signal-detection the-
ory need do to explain such dissociations is add a new cri-
terion for each additional response category. This
amounts however, to adding free parameters. Besides,
even if a parsimonious explanation can be found for a
given effect, it does not necessarily mean that the explana-
tion is the correct one. Instead of questioning the parsi-
mony of the Dual Process model, the approach taken here
has been to challenge the existence of one aspect of this
model's support: the relatively small repetition priming
effect that has had an influential contribution to our
understanding of recognition memory. The results indi-
cate that the effect does not dissociate between subjective
experiences of remembering but solely reflects an increase
in guessing for primed, but previously unseen, stimuli.
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